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Introduct ion.
In recard to the division of law into tvo classes,
written anA unwritten law, the pen of every jurist in the
civilizel world has not failed to touch upon. We cannot
say, howvever, that each argument and definition produced by
them precisely agreed -with the others as if all emanated
from the same stock. On the contrary, differences and con-
flicts of opinion prevail here and there. By the Roman
lawyers themselves, little importance was attached to the
distinction bet-,,eon the classes. And. in every instance
in which they make the 3istinction, they understanA it in
its liter,.l sense. When they talk of written lawV, they do
not mean la':, proceedin' Jirectly from the supreme Legisla-
ture, but law -which was committed to writing at its ori'gin:
quod ab inito literis mandatz est. Law not so committed
to writing, they call unwritten. This distinction of the
so called "grammatical meanin7" is too unimportant to at-
tract our attention and we shall not pause to dwell upon
it, but shall dismiss it, as Mr. Austin justly did. with a
glance.
Our modern authorities took the foundation of the dis-
tinetion to be with reference to the sources of law, and
constructe, their definitions upon that basis. This dis-
tinction of judicial meaning; is, in its turn, very itnpor-
tant for scientific accuracy and practical research. The
modern Civilians say: "tritten lawe is laL, wOiich t;e supreme
legislature makes immediately and directly. Unwritten lao
is not made directly and immediately by t e supreme leqis-
lature, tzouq'h it owves its validity, or is law by t~e au-
thority, expressly or tacitly liven, of the sovereia7n or
state. 0
This demarkation of distinction, in some respects, has
been adioptel by Sir Matthew Hale in his History of the Co--
mon Law and transferred by Sir William Blackqtone into his
Commen ta ri es.
Indeed we appreciate highly this distinction of ju-
dicial meaning and can not put it on a parallel in value
with that of Roman writers. But at the same time we re-
gret that it is at a distance from the most glorious perfec-
tion and not free from all objections. I can appropriately
cite here Mr- Austin's criticism about it: 'The distinction
betwoeen written and unwritten lazo, in ohat Z have called
the judicial meaning of the terms, is important. But as I
have alreadyv indicated, nothing can be less significant or
more 7nisleading than t e terms oritten and unwritten as t~ue
applied. For, first, law, though it originate with t ie
thouqh it ori 7intqte 'ith the supreme Le.Qislature, may be,
and in many cases has been, established and published with-
out writing. And law flozoinq fro-i another source, though
obtaining as law with the consent of the supreme Leglisla-
ture, may be corrvitted to zuriting at its origin. Suc'I,
for instance, are the laws of Provincial and Colonial Leg-
islatures. 4nd such especially, as I shall show hereafter
were the edicts of the Praetors.I
And in another place he direted his attention to the
argument of Blackstone, and says:
M
'peak-lng of the unwritten law, Blackstone says I
style these parts of our law Leges non scriptae, because
their oriiinal institution and authority are not set doon
in writing, as acts of Parliament are, but they receive
their bindinq power, and force of laws, by long and i=-w'e-
morial usage, and by their universal reception throughout
the kin.dom.' Now according to this, the division of
Blackstone and Hale standT thus: Acts of the supreme Leg-
islature are Leges scriptae. But any law, not created
immediately by the supreme Le.gislature, is non z. iztzi,;
Provided, that is, that its original institution be not set
don in writing. Now,, according to this division in v, ich
the two distinctions are manife?tly confounded, wohat be-
comes of laws made i-onediately by subordinate Legislature?
And ', hat -,iould- be t7?e class of Zaw made by judiciil deci-
8ton, of subordinate judges authoritatively recorded?"
After the subtlest criticism of the authorities, he re-
marked that "It may be observed that the terms themselves,
written and unwritten law, are foreign to the lcntiua.7e of
Fn.alish law though found in Brocton (whb.o evideC tlZy borrowed
t7 er fro t~e Poman writers) and in Hale and Black.tone
subsequently. .The terms proper to the -English law; are not
written and unwritten law, but statute law and common law. '
This is true and one cannot bring forward any objection
to it. Nevertheless we are fully authorized, and even
Austin himself justly conceded as tmuch through the valuable
work of his jurisprudeneee, to say that we cannot reject
entirely the terms written and unwritten law as a result of
their general and universal application.
What. then, is the true demarkation of the distinction ?
I do not believe that I can more briefly and more aecurate-
ly mark out the line that Prof. Holland did. He remarked
upon Legislation as the source of law. thus,-
eq!i.!lation, whether by the supreme pozver, or by subor-
dinate a7.thorities permitted to exercise the function,
tends uith advancing civilization to become the nearly ex-
clusive source of ney law. It must be remarked that the
makingq of general orders by our judges, or of by-laws by a
5rail way compan! under its act, is as true legislation as is
carried on by the crown and the three estates of the realm.
in Pa-liarent.
And finally he speaks about viritten and unwritten law
in these terms :-
"In legislation, both the conten2ts of the rule are de-
vised, and leal force 7s given to it by simnultaneou. acts
of the .overeiqmn Po0,,er which produce fwritte' la,'. All
the other law. so',,rce.7 produce what ;s called lunirit ten
la,"', to zohich the sovereicin authority ,ives its 7.",,oZe le-
gal force."
This distinction must be far beyond any objection.
Indeed the terms statute and common law denote the same dis-
tinction as this, but the terms themselves are confined to
English law and are not generally applicable. So, too, it
seems clear, from the criticism above cited, that Mr. Aus-
tin conceded it. Moreover, I cannot help thinkang that he
laid down, prior to any other, the foundations of the above
mentioned distinction.
Having ascertained what is written and unw-ritten lam.
next our attentior is called to the sources, or rather con-
tents of written and unwritten law. But the sources or
contents of written law are not within the boundary of my
present purpoqe. So I would be satisfied here to sa7
simp-ly that they are devised by Legislature, or more accur-
6ately, they flow from the treasures of the mind of legisla-
ture under the oversight of the constitution, or in some
countries, political morality or usages.
What, then, are the sources of unriltten law? To
answer this question the modern authorities periit me to
put forth the followin, arrangement:-
1. Customs and usages.
, Rel i gi on.
1. Adjudication; "Res Judicatae".
4. scientific discussion.
These constitute the chief sources of unwritten law.
The explanation, which would consume a great deal of tinme
and a large amount of paper, is needed to fully comprehend
these constituents. But I will not concern myself to con-
sider more than one of them. If I do, I must wander in a
tedious and limitless way from my destination. So I will
go the right vray and turn at once to the goal at which my
present purpose aims.
In this treatise, I propcse to discuss the law of
customs and usages, which constitute a part of unwritten
law. That much of unwritten law is derived from customs
and usages, needs scarcely any proof or authority. So I
shall examine in the ensuing pages, the followinF7 ouetionS:
1. How large a part of unwritten law of both England
and America is erived from custom s and uFageA?
2. When are custom% transformedi into law?
From my last remark upon unwritten la- it wvould anpear
to any one that the last question does not deserve to be
asked. But eminent jurists in different schools do not
arree with our oboervation. Their vigorous objection to
our authorities and their profound argument on the subject.
challenge all our depth of thought to the full examination.
If I were to say that the subject, at the present time. is
one of the main fields of dispute in Jurisprudence, I would
be safe from the criticism of exaggeration.
Finally I must remark that custom is such a usage as
by common consent and uniform practice wil l become the law
of the place, or of the subject-matter, to which it relates.
So it is evident that custom and usage do not mean differ-
ent things, but the same. The title of my present treat-
ise stands only for the sake of scientific accurary. Here-
after I shall, sometimes, use the accustomed -ord o "custom-
ary law" and u.custom" for the law of customs and usages, &e
after the frequent use of jurists.
The Extension of Customary Law.
--- 0---
I have already remarked that I shall discuss in this
place how large a part of unwritten law, both in England
and in America, was, at one time, in an amorphous form of
heterogeneous custom. But it is not an easy task, nor is
it possible to mark out accuratly its boundary. The
field is too large and some parts of dernarkation are sunk
into an inaccessible shado - of uncertainty. If we should
endeavor to approach to precision and take up, one by one,
the customary laws prevailing in England and the United
States, we would require numerous large volumes, and fin-
ally would be obliged to give up the task with a penetra-
tion tv a darkness of uncertainty whether it is derived
from custom or religian or scientific discussion. But is
a large voluminous work the purpose of my present treatise?
No. Then is it of any interest to throw light upon the
darkness of uncertainty? Certainly it is in some respects
but the service, if I should render it, would not be re-
paid with abundant fruits. Above all, if we compare this
question with the secona subject which I proposed in the
latter part of the introduction, we find it far belo7v that
in value.
By this observation and assumption I shall not delay
9here for a long time and engage myself to collect a dry and
fruitless harvest. I can not, however, quit this subject
without slightly touching upon it. If I hurry immediatly
to my main field I must necessarily dismiss, to a great de-
gree, the appreciation of my present purpose. History may
be studied as history, without any attention to the geo-
g raphical map; but we can not appreciate its real value or
understand completely its intrinsic merits unless we can
fully get the p-eo7rptrhical knowvledcoe. I would say the
same about customary law. To map out its -eneral exten-
sion or situation is most necessary for our further pro-
oress. It is obviously beyond any controversy to assert
that a large part of unwritter law is derived from popular
customs. I say here "a large part" and not more than
that. Some of the classical jurists of Rome and a fe-,,- of
the modern jurists of the civilized nations have employed
the term "customary lav" as a synonym with that of unyrrit-
ten lav. But this presumption is certainly the result of
over-estimation and exarzeration of it, and arose from ob-
scure knovrledge as to the nature oi judicial layv.
A still more objectionable assumption is that of Ir.
Brown, who says: "Indeed, (lI lawts have been in practice
before they oiere put in words, just as every act had its
oriqin in intention. Laws have to do with the conduct of
10
ankind, but they are themselves the result of the conduct
of -nen. hey are the result of the enduring sentiments
and protests of the good against the ephemeral backslidings
of the evil. .4ll laos float in men's minds long before
tOjey send down a precipitate of imperative words. It '",t
have been understood by men that theft-the act of trking
the ,property of another Yvithout his consent-wa wrong be-
fore the, 'ade a law to punish the thief, with a view of
preventi??o sim"ilar depredations. But long before man made
c lczo, they had bolts to their doors, and if they caught
the robber they exercixed their right by taking his booty
fro- hi-m and possibly even inflicting upon him a vengeful
r?/zoish-zent. 2'his oos not done by one party but by many,
and 7,0e see in it the embryonic custom out of ,',hich the law
zas developed. There has been a g7radual evolution of la,.'
fro-7 the nebulous justice P',icb was scattered in men's
minds and found an expression in their conduct, to the
statute book and the whole body of text-book law. The
real legislature is the people and the legislative mac'in-
ery -,,hich exists in this country, including the (zueen, the
houses of Lords and Co,-'ons and courts of lall, are only a
means b71 ihich the will of the people may be ascertained
and reduced to writings. TiPhat Z here aroue is, that the
lecislature is second in point of time to the executive,
tht cu.-tom went before law, and that law is nothin.q but
a.areed upon u. aTe."
This argument has, to a certain extent, a vigorous
strength, but is too general and vague to the scientific
eye. To criticise minutely here this principle of observ-
ation wou!# be to encroach upon the question of the subse-
quent subject, but I can not omit to make one point. It
is a findamental error to assert that all sources of la-,';
written and unwritten, are nothing else but customs and
usages. Wise legislation should no doubt pay prominent
attention to the popular customs; but that is not all.
Beyond it they should look inevitably for some other things
/
sich as rublic policy, circumstances of the time, or equit-
able reason. &c. So it is justly said, and I entirely
agree with the statement, that '[n legislature, both t, e
contents of the rule are devised, and legal force Is civen
to it, bk, simultaneous acts of the sovereig'n power which
produce 'written law'."
Turning to unwritten law, I equally object to the
view of Nr. Brown. Our tribunals do not confine them-
selves to taking up popular sentiment as the only source of
unwritten law. They should go sometimes to the fields of
religion., or more often to scientific discussion, &c.
I will not however repeat here the components of unwritten
law sources, already arrangea in the introduction.
I shall -ut forth simply the extension of customary lawvs in
English common law. which.has been adopted by the United
States.
Customs are said. to be either, (1) General, or those
which prevail throughout the kingdom, or (2l) Particular,
those which for the most part affect only the inhabitants
of a particular place, or the members of a particular class.
Concerning general customs we need say little, just because
so much might be said. By these, whenever they are appli-
cable, the proceedings and determinations of the ordinary
courts of justice are guided and directed as to the course
in which land should descend by inheritance, the method of
acquirirg and transferring property, the requisites and ob-
ligations of contracts, the rules for the construction of
wills, dees and statutes, and by these also the respective
remedies for civil injuries, and many other important par-
ticulars are settled and determined. Those decisions of
courts, which favored the general customs, constitute gen-
eral customary laws.
As to particular customs I must say a little more,
but a precise treatment of these is also beyond the scope
w-hieh I have intended. It is doubtless true that these
particular customs, which are contrary to the general law
of the lan6, are the remains of a multitude of local cus-
toms rrevai ling, some in one part, qoe in another, over
the 7hole country. vhile it was divided into separate do-
minions. V/hen thene qeparate dominions united under one
rule. a unity of customs vas the inevitable result. And
just -is many races under one peaceful rule w.ill become one
race, so many systems of laws will under one rule become
one system. But, further, just as in ethnology we discov-
er instances in which a race, even under the mo-t favorable
conditions, has remained distinct and separate in the midst
of another race. althouF'h living under the common rule and
associated in peace, in intercourse, and in commerce, so we
find. in the study of jurisprudence that certain customs, or
systems of laws, have remained qeparate and dlistinct in the
midst of a "ide and uniform law, and have retained their
characteristic peculiarities in spite of riany conditions
which favored an ar-al'r-anation and a unification of these
varioiis systems. These ,o called nustoms have in many
cases been taken into account and clothed -ith legal force
by the tribunals. These would. be justly said in Eng-land
to be Gavelkind. Borough-English, customs of London and
customs of Manors.
The customs of merchants affect certainly the members
of that class. Ylany writers exclude from the term custom
those rules relative to bi]ls of exchange, partnership, and
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other merchantile matters, which have been clasc ed under
the head "Customs of Verchants" by Blacketone on the qround
that their character is not local, and that their binding
force is not confined to a particular district. It has
been remarked that the law of merchants is in truth only a
part of the general la-, and courts of law must take notice
of it as such. Doubtless where the customs of merchants
are established and settled. by known decisions, it is the
general law of the land." But there are some questions
the decision of which depends upon the customs amongst mer-
chants, which have not hitherto met with judicial recog-
nition, and in such cases it is fit and proper to take the
opinions of the merchants thereon. At any rate I will not
contradict at any lenqth this principle of so many writers.
My postulate is that law which is derived from the customs
of merchants should be, without question, ranked among cup-
tornary laws, for they affect the particular class only,
among the general people of the state.
S. When does custom become transformed into law?
Having ascertained the situation and sphere of custom-
ary law in unwritten law, we have now come to the subject
of transformation of custom into law. In explianing it.
w-ide differences of opinion have been raised among differ-
15
ent schools of jurists. Each of them discu-sec and argues
it from his own point of view. So the result is we are
carryinz, at the prenent time, entirely disagreed weights
of authority ar to the subject. Of course I cannot dis-
charge the task and decide the differences. But we mav
justly hope to ar.proach on a clear reason if we compare
carefully their differences, and examine minutely the
points of error which we think they have obviously committed.
Before we proceed farther I must say, aidled by several
eminent authorities, that heterogeneous custosi in a nation
are transformed into law on the instant they? get legal force
from tribunals authorized by the surreme power of the state.
But there are a good many jurists, ancient and modern, who
3o not accept this doctrine. It is commonly sup-osed by
writers on jurisprudence, Roman, English and others, that
law shaped upon customs obtainn as positive law, independ-
ently of the sanction a~jected to the customs by the state.
Ulpian, who is in all practical law a clearer and more
trustworthy writer than any of the other Roman jurists, re-
marked as to the validity or binding force of custom. that
long custom, in matters which do not come to us on the au-
thoritv of scriptur, is wont to be observed Pro Jure et
Legqe. which we may perhaps translate "as statute law". The
same theory is clearly imnorted into Justinian's Institutes.
And we cannot help thinking that Hale and Blackstone also
committed the same error by the adoption of these Roman au-
thoriteo. It is supposed, for example, by the English
writers that customary lav exists as positive law by force
of immemorial usa-e; and that the decisions of courts have
not created , but have merely expounded or declared it.
But it is an erroneous hypothesis, and one pregnant with
numerous absurdities and inconsistences.
We must necessarily sacrifice a fevw lines to criti-
eise the hypothesis of the foreoing paragraph. All the
customs immemorially current in the nation are not legally
binding. But all these customs would be legally binding,
if the positive laws, which have been made upon some of
them, obtained as positive law by force of immemorial us-
age. And positive law made upon custom is often abolished
by legislature or by judicial decisions. Indeed the writ-
that
ers in question admitAthe continuance of the rule as law
depends on the sovereign pleasure. But supposing it ex-
isted as positive law by virtue of the consens s teft -u ,
it could not be abolished, conformably to that supposition.
without the consent and authority of these, its imaginary
founders. At any rate there is in the hypothesir no line
of demarkation between mere custom and customary law.
So we can never maintain it as a correct one.
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Elsewhere Ulpian gives a ground for the binding force
of custom as "statute law", where he defines mores as the
tacit agreement of the people confirmed by lon custom.
This tacit aFreement was suggested probably by that Greek
idea of a common agreement of the state, vhich Papirian
introduce3 from Demosthenes into his definition of lex.
The same theory is carriel further by Julian, into an in-
exact comparison between the general following of a custom
by the people as a number of individuals, and the formal
passing of a law by the people as an assembly. This "con-
ceitl", as it is termed by, Austin, is eagerly adopteJ by
Blackstone, for which the former author justly takes him to
task. Mr. Austin says"
f/he conceit that customary lai obtains as positive
la-, bZ1 virtue of t7e? consensus utent,-s, ioa.z sug"ested to
its nuTerous -,,oder., partisans bzl certain passag.es in Just-
inian Pandect, particularl:I the follo-'ing passag'e of Julian:
P&nveterata consuetudo pro lege non 17'erito custoditur;
et Aoc'est jus -uod dicitur moribu cons titutin. .am quun
ipsge leqe.- nulla alia ex causa nos teneaz~t,qua-7 quod Judic-
io ?,opuli receptae sunt, -erito et ea, s ine ullo scrip-
to populus probavit, tenebunt o-nnes. .Vam quid interest,
populus suffradio voluntatem suan declaret, an rebus ipsis
et factior P
V.?'i tout pausig1 to analyze the pass 8.qe, 1 shall briefly re-
arZ on - fe of tze errors with !,,Ojic it overftlos.
First, it confounds an act of the people in its collective
and sovereign capacity ,ith the acts of the 'e-libers consid-
ered severally, and as subjects of the sovereign whole.
Secondly, te position maintained in the passlae is this:
t,.at a custo--7ary rule ",lhic the people actually observes,
is equivalent to a la,, wvhich t'ze people establishes formal-
ly; since the people, 'ohich is the sovereign, is the ir"Mme-
diate aithor of each. u
Still he continiaes:
'")ow admitting that the position tJil izold, where tze
people is tze sovereign, how can the position possibly ap-
ply zwhere te people is ruled by an oligarchy, or '7here it
is subject to a monarchy Durinq tie pirtual existence of
the Rom7an conmon."'alth, the position maintained in the pass-
a(e -ight have been plausible. But it is stranae that the
author of the pass-zae, woho lived under Hadrian and .Antonin-
us, after t'2e Roman ,iorld had become virtually a monarc~y
did not 7erceive its absurdity. He must have kno:/,n that
the laws formally established by the virtual monarch, and
customs observed spontaneously by the subject Roman co-,-
munity, could not be referred in any sense whatever, to one
and the same source.9
As to Blackstone he eriticises thus:
'BlackcIto72e borrows this passae of Julian's, enha??c-
ing its oriqin l absurdit., b./ adding nonsense of his o7'In.
Thus", he remarks, after he han cite 4 the passage, "did
t 7zey reason, hu Ze Rome i ad some remains of her freedom.
.4n.Z indeed it is one of the characteristic mar zs of Enqlis
liberty, that our conmo.z law, depends upon custom; whic;
carries this internal evidence of freedom along .ith it,
that it was probably introduced by the voluntary consent of
the people. fow customary law, a., positive law, is estab-
lisied by te sovereign. nd, consequently, ,ohether it be
introduced, or not, by the consent of the people, depends
upon t~e form of government. If the people are the sover-
eign, or if they share the sovereignt.? 'airt: one or a few,
customary law' is the law introduced b'l their con.eznt, in
the strict acceptat';on of the term. But if the people
have no share in the sovereignty, they have no part 7hat-
e7er in the introduction of positive laTv, customary or oth-
er'/ise: and can only be said to consent to its introduction
in t~e remote sense that they acquiesce, whether by reason
of fear or so7.e other motive, in the existence of the gov-
ernmrent '.ich establishes the law.M
Finally he remarked that:
"Sir T'Illia-, Blackstone's meaning 'nay have been this:
that the antecedent custo-,is, 'vhic are tze irouzznd ,)or of
custo7nary la,(,, are necessarily introduced by the consent of
t~e 7eople: or, in other vords, are necessarl4y con.onant
to teir interest,- a7v ',,shes. But even this is false.
If the Deople be enlightened and strona, cust,)n, like law,
be
oiZl co'-'2onl,.,co72so?2ant to their -ishes and interests.
ff theyi be ianorant and wea;e, custom, as iell as law, will
co .72only be aqainst the.- 6c.u
These criticisms of Mr. Austin as to the authorities
above referreJ to should not be objectionable, and I can
not but entirely agree -itlh him. But Mr. James C. Carter
of Ne- - York city recently ma~e an address before the Amer-
ican Bar Association on the Origin an9 Grovth of Uar, and
objecte3 po-erfully to the asqertion of Mr. Austin.
Tr. Carter, after criticiiing >r. Austin's definition
of law. sa-
'It see--7s to me t,.at this attempted e.xplanation of the
genefis of lawi by the ypothesis of a co',-,"-and is wholly/ il-
leqit ;mate. -There is no occasion for any hypothesis.
The !'doZe process i. open to observation, as a matter of
fact, and the solution of the question lies, like that of
any other similar problem, in the scrutiny of actual facts.
Tf e knozw that we have judges, and all we knozo of t72e law
co-,:es from their decisions. The rztatute book, indee ?, is
open to us; bz, t we do not knoo the meaning of this, in any
controverte? cases, ex'cept fro-2 the declarations of the
judges. All the kno ,0ledge, therefore, which ,oe really
have )f t~e lawv co-mes from the jude. But how does he Get
at the lazo? Does he make it? fIf he did it would be his
co'rnand, and not t.'at of a sovereign. But any such impu-
tation of sovereignty to a judie would be contrary to the
observed and manifest fact. The exercise of any such pow-
er would be qroznd for his impeachment. ""-e all kno"' the
method by 17hich he ascertains the law .... ............
That the judge can not make the law is accepted fro- the
start. That there is existing already a rule by which the
case must be determined is not doubted. Unhquestionably
the functions of makinq ad declaring the la- are here
brought into close proximity: But, nevertheless, tie dis-
tinction is not for a moment lost sight of. It is aireed
that the true rule must be somehow found. A4nalog ous cases
are referred to. The customs and habits of men appealed to.
Finlly a rule is deducted ohich, is declared to be o-,?e which
the existing lat, requires to be apvlied to the case.
[nhe conclusion frotm this is that our znrit ten la.>-
"";hic'; is the ma n body of our law- is not a cormand nor a
body of comm.ands, but consists of rules s?)ringing fro--, the
social staneiurd of ju.stice and which have been found in the
course of t,'e application of that standard through a long
period to te tran'action of men'
In another place he concluded his argument:
"If the foregoing vieJ-s are well founde7 , I am no,::
justified in stating the conclusions to zohich they lead.
Those are, that law7 is not a body of connands imposed upon
society fro- ?,'ithout, either by an individual sovereign or
superior, or by a sovereign body constituted by the repre-
sentatives of society itself. It exists at all times as
one of the elements of societiy, 8pringini directl!' fro77
habit anZ custom. It is, therefore, the unconscious crea-
tion of society, or, in other Words, a gro "th. For the
most part, it needs no interpreter or vindication. The
members of society are familiar wzit, its customns and fol-
lo', them; an,- n follooing custo-n they folloi lawo. [t is
only for excenti2,al instances that judicial tribunals or
legislative enactments are needed!
Whether la-r is the eo-nmvinA emanating from the suprene
po :er to an inferior in the state, or not, is a 7reat ques-
tion which neel.3 a long and limitless argument. But wve
are far from the assumption that eu.qtom, which prevails a-
mong people, itself is law, through the historical phenom-
ena or philosophical reason of jurisprudenee What -ere
the ancient YJemistes (19/-zg) in Greece' WVere they
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collections of customs? If custom itself is law, what is
the function of Legislature? It is far beyond any contro-
versy that from the primitive stage of society to the pres-
ent time, the management of law, to make new ones or decide
any case, has been confined to the function of the supreme
power in the state. Moreover there is no doubt that any
one can not break law without incurring on himself the evil,
or more technically, the sanction flowing- from the supreme
power. What. then, would be the law but the command of
that nower? Certainly the judge can not take upon himself
the task which assumes the legislative function. Yet the
moment the judgment is rendered and reported, he passes un-
consciously or unavowedly into a new language and a new
train of thought. We admit that the new decision has mod-
ified the law. In fact it has chanced the old rules, and,
a clear addition has been made to the precedents. This is
clearly to be seen from the nature of the judicial function,
or he could not administer justice, and keep pace ;'rith so-
cial progress.
By the above argument it seeins to me that the jua.zes
can adopt customs to be the sources of unwritten law, aA the
Legislature takes them up as sources of written law. I as-
sert positively that they are fully authorized to do so by
the supreme power of the state. Prof. Holland says: 'The
state has in general t'oo, and only two, articulate oraans
for la, r .hina purpose-the legislature and t ie tribunals.
The first organ makes new law, and t.he second attests and
confirms old IZa", t hou.7h under cover of so doin it intro-
duces "anu nev, principles."
In truth ve can not see any orran, outside these two,
for lavr-makiv purposes in the state. So it would be well
to conclude that custom itself is not law, but custom, and
to deduce loqicallv. to follo--i custom is not to obey law,
but custo n.
When is it transfor-ie! into law? As we have often
seen before, it becomes for the first time law at the mo-
ment it is ar3opted by the courts of law. Professor HIolland
says: " foralitl plus a state enforcinc the observance of
certain Parts of it, is customarl/ law." Ani in another
place he continues,- "'The state, throu.qh its deleoate.as the
.judges, undoubtedlyi qrants recoanition as la, to such cus-
tom. as comre up to a certai,7 standard of aeneral reception
and usefulness.' Lore emphatically Mr- Austin remarke.i
that "[ndepende7?t of t.;e position or establishk ent which
it -"ay receive from the sovere;an, the rule "il'ic' a custom
implies is --erelul a rule of positive, or actual moralityl,
and derives its oblicatory force fro7 the .-enti"ents called
public opinion. U
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In the next piracr-.rih he cont inueq,- ",o a .erel7/ moral,
or merely cu.Ito7a.r7/ rule may take the quality of a legal
rule, or law, in t-oe zoays; ;t may be adopted by a sovereiz!
or subordinate lecislature, and turned into l'zo in t~e dir-
ect -ode; or it -ay be taken as the ground of a judicial de-
a
cision, which afterward.s obtains a.Aprecedent; and in thi'
cqRe it i.T converted into la, after the judicial fashion.
On the first of t~es,- suppositions, the legal rule which is
derived from, the customary is statute l:,,); on the second of
t~e.Te suvpos;itions, the legal rule "ohich is derived from
the customary is a rule of judicial lawo."
lBefore I finish the present treatise, the collateral
question, To what custo-is shoul'J our judges lend legal force?
naturally suggests itself to me to be slightly touched upon.
Some authorities put dowvn the conditions which customs must
fulfill before they can be taken up by the judzes. The
conditions may be enmnerated as follows:-
1. That custom must have been used so long, that the
memory of men runneth not to the contrary.
2. It must have been continued.
. Tt must have been peacable.
4. It must be reasonable.
5. It ought to be certain.
6. It must be compulsory.
7. It must be consistent witls others.
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No doubt these are necessary conditions to be fulfilled.
before any custom will ask the hand of the state. Yet I
w-ish that I might add one ore condition which is that it
must be expedient to the general welfare of the nation.
No-r I shall conclude the fore~oinq arguments this:-
At the time when salutary custoinq which prevail among the
people are adoptel or enforced by the judges they are trans-
formed. from customs into laws; namely, customary lars; and
these customary laws form no doubt a large part of unvrritten
1 aw.
